Discipline and Flexibility - The Stability and Growth Pact by Vantchantchin, Anastasia
HANDELSHÖGSKOLAN I GÖTEBORG 
Discipline and Flexibility: 
The Stability and Growth 
Pact 
      
 
 
 
Author: Anastasia Vantchantchin 
Supervisor: Evert Köstner 
Spring Term 2015 
Bachelor Thesis, 15 ECTS 
University of Gothenburg  
School of Business, Economics and Law 
The Department of Economics 
 
 
  
 
1 
 
ABSTRACT 
In “The economics of the government budget constraint” Stanley Fischer discusses the 
negative implications of government deficits and debts and concludes that to achieve stability 
and growth a state should implement fiscal discipline i.e. keep the budget in balance. 
    In “Fiscal policy rules” George Kopits and Steven Symansky discuss the difficulties for a 
state to exercise fiscal discipline due to the fact that it is politically challenging to implement 
the measures needed to balance the budget. Hence the authors argue for the benefits of fiscal 
policy rules; a set of budget rules for the governing powers to adhere to. According to the 
authors it is however not enough for the Member States to achieve a balanced budget through 
tax increases and expenditure cuts. For a fiscal policy rule to be optimal the rule has to 
provide for structural reforms and give the government the possibility to respond to 
exogenous chocks affecting the economy. 
    Stanley Fischers reasoning on fiscal discipline and budget balance is manifested in an EU 
context through the framework of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). The SGP is designed 
to ensure that the Member States achieves a balanced budget and exercises fiscal discipline. 
    However the SGP-framework has since long been debated, one of the most significant 
questions being whether it is really worth appeasing fiscal discipline at a cost of limiting fiscal 
flexibility. 
    The aim of this study is to investigate how the governing bodies of the EU have used the 
SGP to promote stability and growth in the EU. To achieve this aim the author tries to answer 
the following research question: Have the governing bodies focused on fiscal discipline, fiscal 
flexibility or both when assessing whether a Member State is following the SGP? 
    In an effort to answer the research question and reach the aim the author, by looking at the 
reasoning, and ultimately the decisions, of the Commission and the Council, will evaluate 
whether they have chosen to use on fiscal discipline, and thus enforced the debt and the deficit 
criteria by taking disciplinary action or whether they have allowed the Member States to 
deviate from the debt and the deficit criteria with regard to exogenous shocks to the economy 
and attempted structural reforms, thus using fiscal flexibility.  
    In the thesis it is concluded that the Commission and the Council have allowed the Member 
States to deviate from the debt and deficit targets due to exogenous shocks and attempts at 
structural reforms. However, they have undertaken disciplinary action when the Member 
States has failed to meet the targets and the failure has not been due to the above mentioned 
factors.   
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In “The economics of the government budget constraint” Stanley Fischer discusses the 
different implications of government deficits and debts and concludes that these should be 
avoided if a state aspires to achieve stability and growth. To achieve stability and growth a 
state, according to Fischer, should instead implement fiscal discipline i.e. keep the budget in 
balance.1 
    In “Fiscal policy rules” George Kopits and Steven Symansky discuss the difficulties for a 
state to exercise fiscal discipline. The authors argue that for a government relying on 
discretionary fiscal policy it can be politically challenging to implement the measures needed 
to balance the budget. Hence the authors argue for the benefits of fiscal policy rules: a set of 
budget rules for the governing powers to adhere to. Using this particular kind of framework 
makes it easier for the governing powers to motivate measures needed for holding a balanced 
budget to the electorate.2 
    According to the authors it is however not enough for the Member States to achieve a 
balanced budget through tax increases and expenditure cuts. For a fiscal policy rule to be 
optimal, the authors argue, the rule has to provide for structural reforms and give the 
government the possibility to handle exogenous chocks affecting the economy. Enforcing 
fiscal discipline through a fiscal policy rule without taking the need for fiscal flexibility into 
account will, according to the authors, harm the economy.3 
    Stanley Fischers reasoning on fiscal discipline and budget balance is manifested in an EU 
context through the framework of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) adopted in 1997 by the 
Member States. The SGP is designed to ensure that the Member States achieves a balanced 
budget and exercise fiscal discipline. 
    In 1992, before the adoption of the SGP, the Maastricht Treaty was signed by the Member 
States of the European Union. The Maastricht Treaty created the premises for the creation of 
the euro as a common currency of the European Union by limiting the government deficit to 
3% of GDP and public debt to 60% of GDP.4 The SGP was created as a continuation of the 
criteria underlying the Maastricht Treaty. It was built on the agreement of the Member States 
of the European Union to strengthen the monitoring and coordination of national fiscal and 
                                                 
1 THE ECONOMICS OF THE GOVERNMENT BUDGET CONSTRAINT. The World Bank Research Observer. Fischer. 
1990. vol. 5 issue 2. 
2 Fiscal Policy Rules. Kopits, Symansky. Occasional paper/International Monetary Fund: 162, 1998. p. 2. 
3 Ibid. 
4 http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/economic_governance/sgp/index_en.htm 
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economic policies enabling the enforcement of the limits set for the deficits and debts of the 
Member States by the Maastricht Treaty.5 
    The aim of the SGP, as it is expressed in the Resolution of the European Council on the 
Stability and Growth Pact, is to ensure stability and strong sustainable growth through sound 
government finances.6 
    The SGP-framework has since long been debated. Ever since the Pact was established its 
real effect has been discussed. The doubts have been many, one of the most significant 
questions being whether it is really worth appeasing fiscal discipline at a cost of limiting fiscal 
flexibility.7 
1.1 AIM AND RESEARCH QUESTION 
The aim of this study is to investigate how the governing bodies of the EU have used the SGP 
to promote stability and growth in the EU.  
    To achieve the aim stated above I will try to answer the following research question: 
Have the governing bodies used fiscal discipline, fiscal flexibility or both when assessing 
whether a Member State is following the SGP? 
2. METHOD 
In an effort to answer my aforementioned research question and reach my aim I will examine 
a number of official documents published on the website of the European Commission. The 
documents consisting of continuous reports, opinions and recommendations concerning the 
Member States and the abidance by the SGP by the Member States, issued by the 
Commission. Furthermore the documents consist of continuous recommendations and 
decisions issued by the Council which constitute steps in the Excessive Deficit Procedure 
(EDP) under the SGP as well as the steps preceding the EDP and following it. 
    While the documents deal with the overall state of the economy in the said Member State, 
the relevant part for this study is the reasoning of the governing bodies when deciding 
whether a Member State is in breach of the SGP and how this breach is to be handled. I will 
thus focus on these specific parts of the documents.  
    While looking at the reasoning, and ultimately the decisions, of the Commission and the 
Council I will evaluate whether they have used fiscal discipline, and thus enforced the debt 
                                                 
5 Ibid. 
6 Resolution of the European Council on the Stability and Growth Pact Amsterdam, 17 June 1997. Official 
Journal C 236 , 02/08/1997. 
7 Fiscal discipline and flexibility in EMU: The implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact. Buti, Franco, 
Ongena. Oxford review of economic policy, vol. 14, No. 3. 1998 Oxford University Press and the Oxford Review 
of Economic Policy Limited, p. 95. 
6 
 
and the deficit criteria by taking disciplinary action or whether they have allowed the Member 
States to deviate from the debt and the deficit criteria with regard to exogenous shocks to the 
economy and attempted structural reforms, thus using fiscal flexibility.  
2.1 DELIMITATIONS 
Due to the character and the scope of this study I am unable to include all the Member States 
in the analysis. I will therefore choose two Member States, France and Italy. France and Italy 
have since the creation of the SGP struggled to meet the debt and deficit criteria and are the 
most widely discussed Member States in regard to the SGP which makes them representative 
for this study.8  
    The time frame for this study will be a six year period between the years 2009 and 2015. 
2.2 SOURCES 
The sources that will be used in this study consist of official documents and information 
published on the official website of the Commission. 
    The official documents that I will use will primarily consist of reports, opinions, 
recommendations and decisions issued by the Commission and the Council under the SGP 
framework to the concerned Member States.  
    In addition to the documents mentioned above I will use relevant legal texts, consisting of 
primary and secondary legislation as well as guidelines regarding the SGP.  
2.3 DISPOSITION 
In chapter 3 I will investigate the concepts of fiscal discipline and fiscal flexibility and the 
macroeconomic theories supporting them. Furthermore I will give a brief description of the 
SGP framework.  
    In chapter 4 I will analyze whether the Commission and the Council have used a fiscal 
discipline or fiscal flexibility approach when assessing whether France and Italy is complying 
with the SGP or not and whether disciplinary action is to be taken.  
    In the final chapter of this thesis I will provide some conclusions regarding the actions on 
behalf of the Commission and the Council and whether these actions have been in accordance 
with macroeconomic theory. 
                                                 
8 The Guardian, Brussels defers punishing France and Italy for breaking Eurozone rules, 28th november 2014. 
http://www.theguardian.com/business/2014/nov/28/brussels-european-commission-france-italy-eurozone-
rules 
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3. FISCAL DISCIPLINE, FISCAL FLEXIBILITY AND THE SGP FRAMEWORK 
3.1. FISCAL DISCIPLINE AND FISCAL FLEXIBILITY IN MACROECONOMIC THEORY 
3.1.1. BUDGET DEFICITS AND THEIR IMPACT ON THE ECONOMY 
In The economics of the government budget constraint Stanley Fischer concludes that: 
“Both theory and evidence tell us- and warn us- that large budget deficits pose real threats to 
macroeconomic stability and therefore, to economic growth and development.”9 
    Summarizing the macroeconomic effects of the government budget deficit, illustrated 
through the use of the national income accounts budget deficit identity, the deficit financing 
identity, and the dynamic equation for the evolution of the ratio of public debt to gross 
national product, the author argues that budget deficits should be avoided.10 
    Fischer firstly introduces the national income accounts budget deficit identity that shows 
the relationship between budget deficits and domestic saving and investment as well as the 
current account.11 
 
Budget deficit = (private saving –private investment) + (current account deficit)12 
 
    The national income accounts budget deficit identity illustrates, provided a full 
employment assumption and an assumption that the rate of saving is given, how an increase in 
the deficit leads to a decrease in investment or an increase in the current account due to what 
is called the crowding-out effect.13 
    Fischer continues with the deficit financing identity that shows the different 
macroeconomic imbalances that can occur due to budget deficits.14 
 
Budget deficit = money printing + (foreign reserve use + foreign borrowing) + domestic 
borrowing15 
 
    The deficit financing identity, as it is expressed above, illustrates the relationship between 
the deficit and the current account. However constructed differently, i.e. through placing the 
                                                 
9 THE ECONOMICS OF THE GOVERNMENT BUDGET CONSTRAINT. The World Bank Research Observer. Fischer. 
1990. vol. 5 issue 2, p. 139. 
10 Ibid. p. 127. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid. p. 128. 
13 Ibid. p. 129. 
14 Ibid. p. 127. 
15 Ibid. p. 130. 
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parentheses around money printing and foreign reserve use, can also illustrate the relationship 
between the deficit and domestic credit creation.16 
    Each of the forms of financing illustrated in the deficit financing identity can be associated 
with macroeconomic imbalances such as inflation caused by money printing, exchange crisis 
caused by the use in foreign reserves, external debt crises attributed to foreign borrowing, and 
high interest rates accompanied by an explosively growing debt attributed to domestic 
borrowing.17 
    Furthermore, Fischer presents the dynamic equation for the evolution of the ratio of public 
debt to gross national product that shows the long-run constraints on fiscal policy.18 
 
Change in d = (primary deficit/GNP) – (seignorage/GNP) + (real interest rate – growth rate) 
* d19 
 
    The dynamic equation for the evolution of the ratio of public debt to gross national product 
illustrates the long-term consequences of excessive budget deficits. The ratio of government 
debt to GNP (Gross national product) is denoted d in the equation. The definition of the debt 
includes both the net external and domestic debts. Concerning the equation for the deficit 
financing identity the foreign and domestic borrowing is consolidated and the changes in 
foreign reserves are considered equivalent to net external borrowing.  
    The equation illustrates that the primary deficit has to be financed with new debt as long as 
it exceeds the amount of money creation by the central bank. Additionally nominal interest 
expenditures will have to be refinanced with new debt as well. However the denominator of 
the debt ratio is nominal GNP, consequently the debt ratio will decline with inflation or with 
real GNP growth provided there is no new borrowing20 
    In his conclusion Fischer points out that when it comes to excessive deficits the 
macroeconomics of the government budget constraint show us that the macroeconomic 
imbalances induced by excessive deficits not only pose a threat to macroeconomic stability 
but to economic growth as well.21 
                                                 
16 Ibid. p. 130-131. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid. p. 127. 
19 Ibid. p. 135. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid. p. 138. 
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3.1.2. AVOIDING BUDGET DEFICITS THROUGH FISCAL RULES 
Due to the negative effects of budget imbalances demonstrated above it is generally 
considered necessary to achieve budget balance. One of the methods to achieve this balance is 
through fiscal policy rules. 
    The definition of a fiscal policy rule is a permanent constraint on fiscal policy, this 
constraint, usually defined in terms of an indicator of overall fiscal performance such as the 
government budget deficit and debt expressed as a numerical ceiling or target, in proportion to 
gross domestic product (GDP).22 
    The interest in fiscal policy rules started in the 1980s when a large number of countries 
experienced a deficit bias, reflected in the deterioration in public finances. A large number of 
the advanced economies were experiencing fiscal imbalances as the rise in government 
expenditures was not matched by a proportionate improvement in revenue. The diverging 
structural trends in revenue and expenditure, in combination with a short-run stabilization 
aimed fiscal policy, indicated a largely asymmetrical demand management i.e. budget deficits 
that emerged during recession were not fully offset by equivalent surpluses during economic 
expansions.23 
    At the time this was mainly addressed through adjustment under discretionary fiscal policy, 
this in an attempt to firstly initialize a reduction in the fiscal deficit such that would lead to a 
stabilization of the public debt to GDP ratio at an acceptable level and secondly to keep the 
debt to GDP ratio at this acceptable level. More generally this was an effort to ensure fiscal 
discipline, fiscal discipline that would contribute to stability as well as sustained economic 
growth. However these attempts at discretionary policy would show to be not as successful as 
expected as this proved to be successful only in a relatively small amount of countries. Instead 
for the majority of the advanced economies it was adjustment under fiscal policy rules that 
showed to be successful.24 
    According to George Kopits and Steven Symansky the rationale for fiscal policy rules 
consists primarily of aspects such as macroeconomic stability, long-term fiscal sustainability 
and overall policy credibility, objectives possible to attain through the use of discretionary 
fiscal policy. However one of the main arguments for fiscal policy rules is the political 
economy factor. The authors argue that democratically elected governments have a tendency 
towards being biased to deficits, hence redistributing income from future generations to the 
                                                 
22 Fiscal Policy Rules. Kopits, Symansky. Occasional paper/International Monetary Fund: 162, 1998. p. 2. 
23 Ibid. p. 4.  
24 Ibid. p. 4-6. 
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present generation of their electorate. Due to the sensitivity in these governments towards 
pressure from the electorate, a correction of the bias, without a higher order constraint on 
fiscal policy proves to be difficult. This becomes even more difficult in countries with aging 
populations and rigid social entitlements. Thus, while discretionary fiscal policy may be 
considered to be theoretically superior, it is difficult to implement due to the shortsightedness 
of the electorate making fiscal policy rules the best viable alternative to counter the political 
pressures on fiscal policymaking.25 
    However, according to Kopits and Symansky, for a fiscal policy rule to be effective and 
credible it is not sufficient to set statutory constraints on key fiscal performance indicators. It 
is of outmost importance that the rule is underpinned by a widely shared commitment, 
embraced over time by a succession of governments and observed as intended. Further to be 
fully credible the authors argue that a fiscal policy rule must have a track record of 
satisfactory compliance and it must be supported by well specified future policy measures 
including deep structural reforms where this is needed.26 
    It is, according to the authors, not enough for the Member States to achieve a balanced 
budget through such measures as cuts in investment expenditures, tax increases and different 
types of one-off measures. For a fiscal policy rule to be optimal, the rule has to be supported 
by structural reforms otherwise the fiscal policy rule and i.e. the fiscal discipline it provides 
for, will not lead to stability and growth.27 
    Thus the authors argue there is an efficiency prerequisite. A balanced budget target can 
always be met through one-off measures, these are however to be considered as temporary 
creating time for the preparation and implementation of deep structural reforms in order for 
the adherence to the rule to be ensured in the future.28 
    The problems associated with mandatory social entitlement programs exemplified in net 
unfunded liabilities of social security systems, first and foremost exemplified in the ageing of 
the population, existent in a number of the Member States currently under the SGP, present, 
according to the authors, great difficulties for said Member States to comply with fiscal policy 
rules in the future unless major structural reforms are made.29 It is further argued that it is not 
fiscal consolidation that should be the main focus of the member states of the EMU but rather 
                                                 
25 Ibid. p. 6, 17-18, 22. 
26 Ibid. p. 18. 
27 Ibid. p 17, 22. 
28 Ibid. p. 19. 
29 Ibid. p. 18. 
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the structural rigidities of the European labour markets, an aspect that is considered to 
negatively affect the economies of the Member States.30 
    Budget rules are often built on current values of debt and deficit. Alan J. Auerbach suggests 
in “Budget rules and fiscal policy: Ten lessons from theory and evidence” that current debt 
and deficits are insufficient indicators of fiscal stress. Through the illustration of the 
government budget constraint showing that the stock of government debt from last year plus 
the present value of primary deficits must equal zero, the author points to the fiscal gap 
emerging if this relationship is not held. The author explains the reasons for this fiscal gap as 
being, past deficits, accounted for by the accumulated stock of debt, current deficits, in terms 
of the of primary deficits to GDP, and the projected growth of deficits as a share of GDP, 
relative to the present. One of the main flaws with budget rules are according to the author the 
focus on the first two variables and the ignoring of the third as it is the third variable that is 
considered by the author to be the most important reason for the fiscal gap for the majority of 
the advanced economies. Under current policy trajectories deficits are projected to grow 
substantially faster than GDP. With the growing commitments of unfunded government 
programs, the author argues, budget constraints built on current values of debt and deficit 
miss much of the fiscal challenge typical for an advanced economy with an ageing population. 
This thus suggests that rules that do not take implicit liabilities into account may be hampered 
in their effectiveness in promoting fiscal sustainability.31 Thus the need for fiscal flexibility to 
allow for the implementation of structural reforms addressing the problems associated with an 
ageing population is evident. 
    However, fiscal flexibility is not only needed for the implementation of structural reforms, 
one of the strongest arguments for fiscal flexibility in fiscal policy rules is that flexibility is 
needed in times of recession otherwise forcing governments into undertaking contractionary 
fiscal measures when deficits rise as a consequence of falling revenues and growing 
expenditures.32 
    Thus the flexibility is needed for the accommodation of exogenous shocks that are not in 
the control of the governing powers.33 
                                                 
30 Fiscal discipline and flexibility in EMU: The implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact. Buti, Franco, 
Ongena. Oxford review of economic policy, vol. 14, No. 3. 1998 Oxford University Press and the Oxford Review 
of Economic Policy Limited, p. 95. 
31 Budget Rules and Fiscal Policy: Ten Lessons from Theory and Evidence. Auerbach. German Economic Review. 
Volume 15, Issue 1, pages 84-99, February 2014. p. 91-94. 
32 Ibid. p. 89. 
33 Fiscal Policy Rules. Kopits, Symansky. Occasional paper/International Monetary Fund: 162, 1998. p. 19. 
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3.2 THE DEFINITION OF FISCAL DISCIPLINE AND FISCAL FLEXIBILITY FOR THE PURPOSE 
OF THIS THESIS 
As mentioned above, macroeconomic theory suggests a need for fiscal flexibility within the 
SGP framework. At the same time, running a budget deficit and accruing debt, thus deviating 
from fiscal discipline, can negatively affect the stability and growth of the Member States 
unless the deviation is due to the factors mentioned in section 3.1.2. 
    When assessing the economy of a Member State which is not in compliance with the debt 
or deficit criteria, the Commission and the Council can either 1) strictly enforce the debt and 
deficit criteria by taking disciplinary action or 2) allow the non-compliance due to exogenous 
shocks to the economy or due to the Member States attempts at structural reform. The former 
will, for the purpose of this study be considered as a use of fiscal discipline while the latter 
will be considered as a use of fiscal flexibility. 
3.3 THE STABILITY & GROWTH PACT AND ITS FRAMEWORK 
“The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) is a set of rules designed to ensure that countries in 
the European Union pursue sound public finances and coordinate their fiscal policies.”34 
    The primary aims of the SGP are to facilitate and preserve the stability within the economic 
and monetary unions of the European Union and of the European Monetary Union. This is 
achieved through fiscal monitoring of the Member States of the European Union by the 
European Commission and the European Council.35 The legal basis of the Stability and 
Growth Pact is primarily consistent of Article 121, multilateral surveillance, and Article 126, 
the excessive deficit procedure, of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 
TFEU, as well as Protocol (No12) of the Treaty which stipulates the details surrounding the 
EDP, as well as providing an outlining of the reference values on deficit and debt.36  
    Since its foundation the Stability and Growth Pact has been amended and enhanced on 
several occasions.  
3.3.1 THE SGP FRAMEWORK – THE DEBT AND DEFICIT CRITERIA 
The Resolution and the Regulations 
The Pact is outlined by the Resolution of the European Council on the Stability and Growth 
Pact, adopted on the 17th of June 1997. The Council Resolution as well as two Council 
Regulations serve as the political basis of the Stability and Growth Pact and account for the 
                                                 
34 http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/economic_governance/sgp/index_en.htm 
35 Ibid. 
36 http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/economic_governance/sgp/legal_texts/index_en.htm 
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process and implementation of the SGP as committed to by the Member States, the 
Commission and the Council.37 
    The first regulation, Council Regulation 1466/97 on the strengthening of the surveillance of 
the budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies, serves as 
the basis for the preventive arm.38 The second regulation, Council regulation 1467/97 on 
speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the EDP, serves as the basis for the 
corrective arm.39 
    The rules of the preventive arm, which entered into force in 1998, are set to bind the 
Member States and their governments to their commitments towards sound fiscal policies and 
coordination through an implementation of budgetary targets for each of the countries 
involved. These budgetary targets are called Medium- Term Budgetary Objectives, MTOs.40 
    The corrective arm on the other hand consists of the EDP which ensures the correction of 
excessive budget deficits or excessive public debt levels through a process that reins in 
excessive deficits and reduces excessive debts. The definitions of an excessive budget deficit 
and an excessive public debt are given by the EU Treaty and are set to 3% of GDP and 60% 
of the GDP respectively.41 
    The procedure surrounding an EDP is outlined in Article 126 of the Treaty. In case of a 
Member State being incompliant with either one or both of the criteria above, the Commission 
shall prepare a report. A report may be prepared in case of a risk of an excessive deficit in a 
Member State as well. Following the Commission report, the Economic and Financial 
Committee shall formulate an opinion on the report of the Commission. Finding that an 
excessive deficit in a Member State exists or may exist the Commission shall address an 
opinion to the Member State as well as notifying the Council accordingly.42 
    Subsequently the Council shall, on a proposal from the Commission, following an overall 
assessment, decide whether an excessive deficit exists in a Member State. Following the 
decision the Council shall adopt, based on a recommendation from the Commission, 
                                                 
37 Resolution of the European Council on the Stability and Growth Pact Amsterdam, 17 June 1997. Official 
Journal C 236 , 02/08/1997. 
38 COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 1466/97 of 7 July 1997 on the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary 
positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies. 
39 COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 1467/97 of 7 July 1997 on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of 
the excessive deficit procedure. 
40 http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/economic_governance/sgp/index_en.htm 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid. 
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recommendations addressed to the Member State concerned with a view to bringing that 
situation to an end within a specified period of time.43 
    After a recommendation from the Commission, the Council shall abrogate some or all of 
the decisions and recommendations issued by the Council if the Council in its opinion 
considers the excessive deficit to have been corrected.44 
 “Making the best use of the flexibility within the existing rules of the Stability and Growth 
Pact” 
The latest addition to the evolvement of the Pact was issued in 2015. It is a communication 
called “Making the best use of the flexibility within the existing rules of the Stability and 
Growth Pact” presented by the Commission. In the communication it is stated that the 
Commission will henceforth take into account several aspects in the implementation of the 
legal framework.45 
    It is rigorously emphasized that the communication is not created to serve as an alteration 
or a replacement of existing rules, it is to be seen as an interpretive communication providing 
additional guidance on how the Commission will apply its margin of interpretation in the 
implementation of the existing rules.46 
    The communication is a contribution to a development of a more growth-friendly fiscal 
attitude in the EMU. However it is also part of the Commission’s efforts in reinforcing the 
effectiveness and the understanding of the intricate rules the Commission itself is responsible 
for applying.47 
    The aspects mentioned in the communication are investments, structural reforms and 
cyclical conditions. The structural reforms part is to concern both the Member States not 
undergoing an EDP as well as the Member States undergoing an EDP. The Member States not 
in the EDP will be allowed additional flexibility to deviate from the MTO or the path towards 
it, provided it is temporary. The positive fiscal impact of the structural reforms will be taken 
into account if the reforms are major, have verifiable direct long-term positive budgetary 
effects, including raising potential sustainable growth, and are fully implemented. For the 
Member States undergoing an EDP the existence of a dedicated structural reform plan when 
                                                 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Making the best use of the flexibility within the existing rules of the Stability and Growth Pact (January 2015). 
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid. 
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recommending a time limit for the correction of the excessive deficit or the duration of the 
extension to that time limit will be taken into account by the Commission.48 
  
                                                 
48 Ibid. 
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4. ANALYSIS 
4.1 FRANCE 
Since the establishment of the SGP the economy of France has been far from stable with high 
government debts reaching an all-time high of 95,8% for the government debt to GDP ratio in 
2015. The numbers for the government deficit have been far from low as well with numbers 
reaching far over the allowed 3% target put forward by the Pact, resulting in a deficit for 2015 
of 3,5% of GDP. On account of the persisting deficits and debts France has been under the 
excessive deficit procedure on multiple occasions the latest starting in 2009.49 
 1995-
2010 
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Gross 
public 
debt (% 
of GDP) 
64,3 85,2 89,6 92,3 95,4 95,8 96,4 
Public 
budget 
balance 
(% of 
GDP) 
-3,4 -5,1 -4,8 -4,1 -4,0 -3,5 -3,4 
GDP 
growth 
(%) 
1,8 2,1 0,3 0,3 0,2 1,2 1,3 
Economic development-Key figures- France 1995-2016.50 
4.1.1 THE FIRST STEP IN THE EDP – THE COMMISSION REPORT 
On February 18th 2009 a Commission report was issued on the economic situation in France. 
The Commission report stipulated an excessive government deficit of 3,2% of GDP in 2008, 
planned to increase further. The deficit was attributed to the severity of the economic 
recession, to be seen in the context of the unprecedented global financial crisis and economic 
downturn. However the excessive deficit was considered depending more on the lack of 
adequate fiscal consolidation at the time when the conditions for the economy were more 
favorable. Hence if the necessary measures would have been implemented at that time this 
would have provided France with a safety margin that would have protected the country from 
                                                 
49 http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/economic_governance/sgp/deficit/countries/france_en.htm 
50 European economic forecast- Spring 2016- France (DG ECFIN). The figures in the table and the figures in the 
analysis may differ on account of the figures in the analysis being on most part projections. 
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breaching the deficit rule when the economic recession was a fact. Thus the excessive deficit 
was not fulfilling the requirement to be assessed as exceptional leading to the suggestion on 
behalf of the Commission that the deficit criterion of the Pact was indeed being breached.51 
    The general government debt of the country had been above the reference value for a 
considerable amount of time and an increase was expected. The debt criterion of the Pact was 
thus considered to be breached as well.52 
    Although due consideration was given to the relevant factors surrounding the excessive 
deficit, on their own merit considered favourable, the deficit was after all remaining close to 
the reference value and the excess was expected to be temporary, however the deficit was not 
fulfilling the criteria of being exceptional. Thus, the Commission found it necessary to 
undertake enhanced surveillance under the EDP.53 
4.1.2 THE EDP IS ENFORCED 
On March 24th 2009 the Commission issued a Commission Opinion on the existence of an 
excessive deficit in France. The opinion, based on the budgetary situation in France in regard 
to the deficit and debt criteria laid down in Article 126 of the Treaty, as well as the 
Commission report preceding the opinion, stated that the Commission is of the opinion that an 
excessive deficit exists in France.54 
    Thus the second step in the EDP process was applied giving way for the recommendations, 
to end the excessive deficit situation, to come. 
4.1.3 THE RECOMMENDATION AND THE DECISION 
Following the Commission opinion was a Commission recommendation for a Council 
recommendation to France with a view to bringing an end to the situation of an excessive 
government deficit. It was issued on March 24th 2009 as well. 55 
    In accordance with the greater flexibility in the application of the EDP introduced with the 
2005 reform of the Stability and Growth Pact special circumstances were deemed to exist in 
the case of France. The global financial crisis was considered instrumental to the sharp 
                                                 
51 Report from the Commission France Report prepared in accordance with Article 104(3) of the Treaty. 
Brussels, 18.2.2009. SEC(2009) 190 final. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Commission opinion on the existence of an excessive deficit in France. Brussels, 24.3.2009. SEC(2009) 569 
final. 
55 Recommendation for a Council recommendation to France with a view to bringing an end to the situation of 
an excessive government deficit. Brussels, 24.3.2009. SEC(2009) 571 final.  
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deterioration of the economy in France thus creating the basis for the existence of special 
circumstances.56 
    The report concluded that budgetary consolidation measures would lead to a reinforcement 
of the growth potential of the economy as well as leading to durable improvement in the 
general government balance.57 
    It was further stated that in accordance with the existence of special circumstances the 
French authorities were allowed for a correction of the excessive deficit at a slower pace and 
should hence put an end to the present excessive deficit situation by 2012 as well as ensuring 
that the government gross debt ratio is put on a sufficiently declining path approaching the 
reference value at a satisfactory pace.58 
    On the basis of the documents above the Commission simultaneously issued a Commission 
recommendation for a Council decision on the existence of an excessive deficit in France.59 
    On April 27th 2009 a Council decision on the existence of an excessive deficit 
(2009/414/EC) was issued in which it was stated that having regard to the recommendation 
from the Commission as well as to the observations made by France the Council considers an 
excessive deficit to exist in France. No account was taken to relevant factors in the steps 
preceding the decision as the double condition, of the deficit being close to the reference 
value as well as being temporary, was considered not to be met by France.60 
    Founded on the preceding documents by the Commission a Council recommendation to 
France with a view to bringing an end to the situation of an excessive government deficit was 
issued at the same time as the Council decision. The Council recommendation stated that the 
French authorities should put an end to the excessive deficit situation by 2012.61 
    This concluded the steps leading up to the EDP and France was officially once again found 
under the corrective arm of the SGP forcing the country to enforce the set out measures and 
position its economy on a balanced path towards the limits set out by the Pact. 
4.1.4 FURTHER RECOMMENDATIONS 
On November 11th 2009 the Commission came out with a new Commission recommendation 
for a Council recommendation to end the excessive deficit situation stating that assessed 
                                                 
56 Ibid. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Recommendation for a Council decision on the existence of an excessive deficit in France. Brussels, 
24.3.2009. SEC(2009) 570 final. 
60 Council decision of 27 April 2009 on the existence of an excessive deficit in France. (2009/414/EC) 
 27 April 2009. 
61 Council recommendation to France with a view to bringing an end to the situation of an excessive 
government deficit. 27 April 2009. 
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against the economic forecast underlying the initial Council recommendation, adopted on 
April 27th 2009, unexpected adverse economic events affecting the budget in an unfavorable 
way had occurred in France. The action taken by France, taking into account the economic 
developments compared to the outlook in the forecast underlying the Council 
recommendation, were assessed to be adequate, the governing powers of France had 
implemented the fiscal measures according to plan but would not be able to reach the set out 
targets within the time limit put forward in the preceding Council recommendation due to the 
aforementioned unexpected adverse economic events. 
    Mentioning these factors it was thus considered that the target date set in the Council 
recommendation on April 27th 2009 should be revised and extended by one year. It was 
however stated that the consolidation efforts should be strengthened compared to that 
projected by the French authorities. Furthermore, a specification of the necessary measures, 
created to achieve the correction of the excessive deficit by 2013, should be done by the 
French authorities. Concluding the Commission recommendation was an outline for a new 
Council recommendation based on the new circumstances underlying the new 
recommendation stipulating the new target date to 2013.62 
    Following the Commission recommendation was subsequently a Council recommendation 
to France with a view to bringing an end to the situation of an excessive government deficit, 
specifying the new conditions put forward in the Commission report and consequently 
extending the deadline by one year setting the time limit to the year 2013.63 
4.1.5 ASSESSMENT ON ACTION TAKEN 
A Commission communication on action taken was issued on June 15th 2010. The 
Commission assessed adequate progress on behalf of France towards the correction of the 
excessive deficit within the time limits put forward by the Council in the renewed Council 
recommendation. France was credited with having implemented the deficit-reducing measures 
as planned in 2010. France was credited with having outlined the details for the strategy 
required to progress towards the correction of the excessive deficit by 2013 as required by the 
Council recommendation. However France was once again urged to take further steps 
specifying the consolidation measures for the years to come in order to make sure a correction 
                                                 
62 Recommendation for a Council recommendation to France with a view to bringing an end to the situation of 
an excessive government deficit. Brussels, 11.11.2009. SEC(2009) 1550 final. 
63 Council recommendation to France with a view to bringing an end to the situation of an excessive 
government deficit. 02.12.2009. 
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of the excessive deficit in time. Nevertheless further steps in the EDP were not considered to 
be needed.64 
4.1.6 FURTHER RECOMMENDATIONS 
On May 29th 2013 the Commission issued a Commission recommendation for a Council 
recommendation with a view to bringing an end to the situation of an excessive deficit in 
France for a third time. The recommendation emphasized the deterioration in the budgetary 
position due to an overall weakening of the position of the general economy, not least effected 
by the economic crises, suggesting revised recommendations under Article 126(7) TFEU for 
France with an extension of the time limit by the Council for the correction of the excessive 
deficit by 2015. The circumstances underlying the 2009 Council recommendation were 
considered to have altered to such an extent that a revised recommendation was considered 
justified under the rules of the SGP.65 
    An extension of the time limit by only one year, although the rule according to Council 
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97, was considered to be inadequate and unreasonably pressuring, 
implying targets well above the ones recommended for the period of 2010-2013, by the 
Council in the renewed Council recommendation issued on December 2nd 2009, as well as 
considered hampering on the projected economic recovery for the year to come. A two- year 
extension was argued for, primarily on the grounds of the possibility of bringing down the 
excessive deficit below 3% of the GDP in 2015 in addition of having a minimal effect on 
growth in 2014 and 2015.66 
    For the budgetary targets to be achieved the importance of a full implementation of the 
already adopted measures for 2013 was stressed. Furthermore a specification, adoption and 
implementation of further measures for the years 2014 and 2015 were underlined.67 
    The Commission continued by stating that all the conditions for an extension of the 
deadline for correcting the excessive general government deficit, as stated in Article 3(5) of 
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the EDP 
were fulfilled.68 
                                                 
64 Communication from the Commission to the Council Assessment of the action taken by Belgium, the Czech 
Republic, Germany, Ireland, Spain, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, Slovenia and Slovakia in 
response to the Council Recommendations of 2 December 2009 with a view to bringing an end to the situation 
of excessive government deficit. Brussels, 15.6.2010. COM(2010) 329. 
65 Recommendation for a Council recommendation with a view to bringing an end to the situation of an 
excessive government deficit in France. Brussels, 29.5.2013. COM(2013) 384 final. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Ibid. 
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    Thus on June 21st 2013 a third Council recommendation with a view to bringing an end to 
the situation of an excessive government deficit in France was therefore issued. It was issued 
on the basis of the Commission recommendation from May 29th 2013.69 
4.1.7 ASSESSMENT ON ACTION TAKEN 
On November 15th 2013 the action taken by France was once again assessed in a Commission 
communication this time based on the action taken in consideration to the new Council 
recommendation issued on June 21st 2013. At the time France was considered making 
sufficient progress with no further steps in the EDP needed.70 
    However as early as on March 5th 2014 a Commission recommendation regarding 
measures to be taken by France in order to ensure a timely correction of its excessive deficit 
was issued due to fears from the Commission that France would not meet the targets set out in 
the recommendation issued on June 21st 2013. The Commission urged France to undertake the 
measures needed to correct the excessive deficit in the country in a timely manner. In the 
communication it was clearly stated that there was a significant risk of non-compliance with 
the recommended fiscal effort in 2013 as well as in 2014. Accordingly France was urged to 
make efforts to ensure full compliance with the Council recommendation of June 21st 2013.71 
4.1.8 FURTHER RECOMMENDATIONS 
On February 27th 2015 the Commission issued a Commission recommendation for a Council 
recommendation with a view to bringing an end to the excessive government deficit in France, 
for a fourth time, stipulating that the budget deficit in France according to the Commission 
2015 forecast is expected to exceed the target set in the Council recommendation of June 21st 
2013 and thus the 3% of the GDP benchmark required in the SGP by reaching a figure of 
4,1% of the GDP in 2015. This despite, what are considered to be, significant efforts 
undertaken on the behalf of the Member State to rein in the increase in public expenditures. 
Thus the evidence did not allow for the conclusion that no effective action had been 
undertaken. However due to low inflation those measures were not sufficient to reach the 
budgetary targets. Thus the significant decline in the position of the budget due to a 
weakening of the economy in the country as a whole was considered to have substantially 
                                                 
69 Council recommendation with a view to bringing an end to the situation of an excessive government deficit 
in France. Brussels, 18 June 2013. 
70 Communication on action taken. Assessment of action taken by Spain, France, Malta, The Netherlands and 
Slovenia in response to the Council Recommendations of 21 June 2013 with a view to bringing an end to the 
situation of excessive government deficit, and by Belgium in response to the Council Decision to give notice of 
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changed the premise on which the Council recommendation of June 21st 2013 was founded 
therefore calling for a revised recommendation under Article 126 (7) TFEU for France, setting 
a new time limit to correct the excessive deficit.72 
    The public debt in France is expected to rise and to reach 97,1% of GDP in 2015 and 
98,5% of GDP in 2016, targets estimated by the Commission in its 2015 forecast.73 
    On November 21st 2014 the French authorities notified the Commission with a letter stating 
that the country had committed to several growth- enhancing structural reforms implementing 
the country specific recommendations (CSRs) issued by the Council on July 8th 2014. On 
December 12th 2014 a reform agenda was published by the government of France stating the 
reform priorities until 2017. The reform agenda was confirmed in a communication on the 
National Reform Programme (NRP) made public on February 18th 2015. With this 
information the government of France also provided a quantification on the expected 
macroeconomic impact of the reforms already initiated. The main reforms expected to 
contribute to growth and the sustainability of public finances were a reduction in the cost of 
labour and additional reductions in the social security contributions aimed at the employer, 
however considered in need of further strengthening by complementary reforms addressed at 
reducing wage rigidities. Further reforms expected to contribute to growth and the 
sustainability of public finances in the long-term were the 2014 pension reform, measures 
aimed at reforming the local authorities, reforms improving the business environment and 
measures aimed at increasing competition in services. However the Commission pointed to 
the lacking response on the behalf of France in regard to previous recommendations aimed at 
improving macroeconomic imbalances and would hence take into account the level of 
ambition provided in the upcoming National Reform Programme and other commitments 
before deciding whether there was need for further recommendations on account of the 
existence of an excessive imbalance and recommending that France take corrective action.74 
    The commitments on the behalf of France in regard to structural reforms were however 
considered adequate and on the right path taking into consideration the latest communication 
“Making the best use of the flexibility within the existing rules of the Stability and Growth 
Pact” and thus, under this premise, an extension of the deadline for the correction of the 
excessive deficit by more than one year was considered to be in order.75 
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    The rules of the Pact dictate only a one- year extension for correction. However this was, 
for the second time, considered too demanding considering the weak economy of France. 
According to the Commission 2015 forecast the economic adjustment needed, if only one 
year was granted, would have a damaging effect on growth in the country, as well as being 
significantly above the annual average effort for 2013-2015 recommended by the Council in 
the Council recommendation to end the excessive deficit situation issued on June 21st 2013. 
Consequently, the commission, on these grounds as well as taking into account the announced 
reform plans, found it suiting to extend the deadline to bring an end to the excessive deficit by 
two years. However the French authorities were expected to ensure full implementation of 
both the adopted as well as planned reforms, which, if required, were expected to be 
reinforced. If France were to fail the reform plans put forward by the country the Commission 
would find it aggravating and to a disadvantage for the country when assessing the effective 
action taken in response to the recommendation put forward by the Commission on February 
27th 2015.76  
    The Commission insisted on full implementation of the already announced measures for 
2015 and a specification, adoption as well as implementation of additional measures needed 
to achieve the budgetary targets set for 2015, 2016 and 2017. Furthermore France was 
expected to report on the reform plan presented in the communication on February 18th 2015 
which was expected to be further complemented in the NRP. The NRP was to be 
implemented in a strict manner so as to improve the growth of the economy in the country and 
to contribute to the long- term sustainability of the public finances. It was further expressed 
that it is important that the fiscal consolidation is strengthened by the implementation of 
comprehensive and ambitious structural reforms.77 
4.1.9 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The financial crisis of 2008 is considered by the Commission and the Council to have affected 
France throughout the investigated timeframe. It is considered to be a mitigating factor for 
France’s failure to meet the budget targets in all investigated documents, resulting in a two 
year extension of the deadline for the correction of budgetary targets rather than the ordinary 
one year limit in 2013 and 2015. However, France has, according to the Commission and the 
Council, been lacking in the implementation of measures to ensure budget stability before, as 
well as during the financial crisis. France failure to implement the necessary measures 
prompted the Commission and the Council to take disciplinary action against the Member 
                                                 
76 Ibid. 
77 Ibid. 
24 
 
State despite the exogenous shock to the economy on two occasions, on February 18th 2009 
with the opening of an EDP and on March 5th 2014 with the issuing of an extraordinary 
recommendation for France to implement the necessary measures to reach the deficit and debt 
targets. 
    Thus the factor of exogenous shocks to the economy has influenced the decisions of the 
Commission and the Council but has not been decisive on every occasion. Fiscal discipline 
has on two occasions been considered as more important, resulting in disciplinary action by 
the Commission and the Council.  
    Beginning with the Commission recommendation issued on February 27th 2015 France is, 
on the basis of the implementation of growth-enhancing structural reforms, granted the 
possibility to deviate from the set out targets. This is due to the communication on “Making 
the best use of the flexibility within the existing rules of the Stability and Growth Pact”. The 
Commission and the Council have since the issuing of the aforementioned communication 
added the factor of attempts at structural reform when assessing whether disciplinary action is 
to be taken towards a Member State that does not meet the debt and deficit criteria. This 
creating a stronger basis for fiscal flexibility within the SGP framework.  
    Addressing the aforementioned research question, the Commission and the Council have 
allowed France to deviate from set targets due to exogenous shocks and attempts at structural 
reforms. However, they have also criticized France for not undertaking sufficient measures 
and undertaken disciplinary action when France has failed to meet the targets and the failure, 
according to the Commission and the Council, has not been due to exogenous shocks or 
attempts at structural reforms.  
    The actions of the Council and the Commission has thus been in line with the 
macroeconomic theory behind fiscal discipline and fiscal flexibility. France was allowed to 
deviate from the debt and deficit targets due to exogenous shocks and attempts at structural 
reform. When France did not meet the targets due to the Member State not undertaking 
necessary measures and due to the failure to undertake necessary measures to make the 
economy more resilient to exogenous shocks prior to the financial crisis the Council and the 
Commission took disciplinary action and enforced fiscal discipline. 
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4.2 ITALY 
The Italian economy has since the introduction of the SGP been experiencing high debts on 
occasion accompanied by high deficits. With debt to GDP ratios reaching over one hundred 
percent the Italian debt to GDP ratio was recorded at an all-time high in 2015 at 132,7%. 
Granted that the Italian deficit for 2015 was at 2,6% of GDP the deficit ratios of the Member 
State has on multiple occasions reached far over the allowed 3% target put forward by the 
Pact. Accordingly Italy has been under an excessive deficit procedure on several occasions, 
the latest starting in 2009.78 
 1995- 
2010 
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Gross 
public 
debt (% 
of GDP) 
107,1 116,4 123,1 128,5 132,5 132,7 132,7 
Public 
budget 
balance 
(% of 
GDP) 
-3,6 -3,5 -3,0 -2,9 -3,0 -2,6 -1,9 
GDP 
growth 
(%) 
1,0 0,6 -2,8 -1,7 -0,3 0,8 1,1 
Economic development- Key figures- Italy 1995 -201679 
4.2.1 THE FIRST STEP IN THE EDP – THE COMMISSION REPORT 
On October 7th 2009 the Commission issued a report assessing the economic situation in Italy 
especially with an emphasis on the deficit and the debt criterion of the SGP. The planned 
government deficit for 2009 was 5,3% of GDP with a growth of real GDP estimated to -4,8%. 
The deficit was considered exceptional, especially as Italy´s economy had been adversely 
affected by the 2008 financial crisis which had resulted in a severe economic downturn. 
However the deficit was not considered to satisfy the two further criteria, the double 
condition. The deficit was forecasted to remain above the reference value until 2011 and to go 
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79 European economic forecast- Spring 2016- Italy (DG ECFIN).The figures in the table and the figures in the 
analysis may differ on account of the figures in the analysis being on most part projections. 
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down to 2,7% of GDP in 2012 in combination with returning positive real GDP growth. The 
deficit criterion in the Treaty was thus not considered to be fulfilled.80 
    The general government gross debt was set to 115,3% of GDP in 2009 exceeding the 
reference value put forward by the Treaty. The planned deficit levels over the period of 2009-
2010 and the growth projections for the years implied that the government debt-to-GDP ratio 
would indeed move away from the set out reference value. The debt-to-GDP ratio was thus 
not considered as sufficiently diminishing and approaching the reference value at a 
satisfactory pace as expressed in the Treaty and the SGP, consequently leaving the debt 
criterion of the Treaty unfulfilled as well.81 
    The relevant factors, examined by the Commission, presented a mixed picture. The 
complexity of the economic situation in the country was clearly demonstrated by the fact that 
the real GDP in Italy, impacted by a weak productivity growth, had been quite low for a 
substantial amount of time, hence the global economic downturn when it hit the country, also 
hit a weak economy. Thus while potential growth was strongly influenced by the economic 
downturn in 2009, the structural weaknesses underlying the slow productivity dynamics in the 
country were, in the opinion of the Commission, to continue to have a negative effect on 
growth, making the recovery process very slow. The Commission concluded that the opening 
of an EDP was necessary.82  
4.2.2 THE EDP IS ENFORCED 
Following the report, a Commission opinion on the existence of an excessive deficit in Italy 
was issued on November 11th 2009. The opinion, based on the budgetary situation in Italy in 
regard to the deficit and debt criteria laid down in Article 126 of the Treaty as well as on the 
Commission report preceding the opinion, stated that the Commission is of the opinion that 
there exists an excessive deficit in Italy. 
    Thus the process of the EDP was started and the recommendations, to end the excessive 
deficit situation, were to come. 
4.2.3 THE RECOMMENDATION AND THE DECISION 
In addition to the release of the opinion, two additional documents were issued consisting of a 
Commission recommendation for a Council recommendation to Italy with a view to bringing 
an end to the situation of an excessive government deficit and a Commission recommendation 
for a Council decision on the existence of an excessive deficit in Italy. 
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    In the Commission recommendation the Commission emphasized the fact that special 
circumstances apply in the case of Italy and thus a greater flexibility would be used in the 
application of the EDP according to the 2005 reform of the SGP. The financial crisis was, as 
before, considered having a damaging effect on the Italian economy, creating the premise on 
the behalf of the Council to allow for the correction of the excessive deficit situation at a 
slower pace thus setting the deadline for the correction of 2012. In addition the importance of 
achieving the MTO was stressed, this, to ensure the convergence of the debt ratio towards a 
suitable level, taking into account the implicit liabilities related to ageing, and ensure that the 
budgetary consolidation undertaken towards the MTO, after the correction of the excessive 
deficit, is sustained as well. Further specification of the budgetary consolidation measures 
needed for the improvement of the general government balance reinforcing the growth 
potential of the economy were stressed.83 
    On the basis of the documents above, the Commission issued the Commission 
recommendation for a Council decision.84 
    Following the preceding documents was consequently a Council decision on the existence 
of an excessive deficit in Italy (2010/286/EU), in which it was stipulated that Italy was indeed 
not fulfilling the deficit criteria and not the debt criteria either. It was however also said that 
the deficit planned for 2009, 5,3% of GDP, considered exceeding and not close to the 3% of 
GDP reference value, was nonetheless considered as exceptional, in particular due to the fact 
that it was resulting from a severe economic downturn, within the meaning of the Treaty and 
the SGP. The general government gross debt however had been exceeding the target of 60 % 
of GDP for a long time and planned to reach 115,1% of GDP in 2009 with a forecast 
predicting further increase. Thus the debt ratio was not considered diminishing sufficiently 
and approaching the reference value at a satisfactory pace in the sense of the Treaty and the 
SGP.85 
    At the same time the Council issued a Council recommendation to Italy, with a view to 
bringing an end to the situation of an excessive government deficit, in which the special 
circumstances surrounding Italy’s deficit were once again mentioned. The special 
circumstances were once again stressed especially in the context of the EDP and the greater 
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flexibility, introduced with the 2005 reform. In particular the global financial and economic 
crisis and the strong adverse effect it had had on the Italian economy was emphasized. The 
widening deficit in 2009 was attributed mainly to the automatic stabilizers preventing a 
further deterioration of public finances especially given the high gross debt but in the end 
raising the deficit. A fiscal effort was recommended considering the circumstances.86 
    Moreover the Italian authorities were requested to seize all opportunities possible beyond 
the fiscal effort, to accelerate the reduction of the gross debt ratio towards the 60% of GDP 
reference value.87 
    The documents above confirmed the excessive deficit in the country and Italy was found 
not abiding by the rules set out by the Pact. 
4.2.4. ASSESSMENT ON ACTION TAKEN 
On June 15th 2010 the Commission presented a communication to the Council assessing the 
action taken by Italy in response to the recommendation from the Council. The assessment 
stated that Italy was recommended by the Council to put an end to the deficit situation by 
2012. Italy was considered making adequate progress towards the correction of the excessive 
deficit, in line with the set out targets and the time limit. The Commission especially brought 
forward the implementation of the consolidation measures for 2010, implemented as 
recommended by the Council. It was nevertheless stressed that in order to achieve the 
correction of the excessive deficit in time, a strict implementation of the planed measures had 
to be ensured, as well as ensuring that the debt ratio gets on a downward path by 2012. Thus 
the procedure surrounding Italy was considered not in need of any further steps being 
implemented, consequently closing the communication on a positive note.88 
4.2.5 THE ABROGATION OF THE COUNCIL DECISION 
On May 29th 2013 a Commission recommendation for a Council decision abrogating the 
former Decision 2010/286/EU on the existence of an excessive deficit in Italy was issued by 
the Commission.89 
    It was considered that based on the fact that Italy had corrected the deficit, although the 
debt was still excessive and forecasted to rise to 131,4% of GDP in 2013 (being at 127, 0% in 
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2012), the decision should, in the opinion of the Commission, be abrogated. Part of this 
decision was contributed to the fact that the rise in the debt level was mostly contributed to 
Italy having made a substantial contribution to financial assistance to the Member States of 
the European Monetary Union 90 
    However starting in 2013, the year following the correction of the excessive deficit, Italy 
was obliged to continue towards the medium-term objective set out for the country, making 
satisfactory progress towards compliance with the debt criterion in accordance with Council 
Regulation (EC) 146/97.91 
    The Council decision abrogating Decision 2010/286/EU on the existence of an excessive 
deficit in Italy (2013/314/EU) repealed the former decision on the existence of an excessive 
deficit, on the grounds presented by the Commission, and so the EDP for Italy was closed.92 
4.2.6 A NEW COMMISSION REPORT 
On February 27th 2015 the situation of Italy was once again assessed, this time in a new 
Commission report. The Commission report was prepared in accordance with Article 126(2) 
TFEU where it was specified that the Commission has within its task the obligation to 
monitor the compliance with budgetary discipline on the basis of two criteria, the first being 
whether the planned or actual government deficit exceeds the reference value of 3% and the 
second one being whether the government debt exceeds the reference value of 60%.93  
    The report continued by stating that the report indicated the first step in the EDP and 
analyzed the question whether Italy was compliant with the debt criterion. It stipulated that 
following the amendments to the Pact in 2011, the debt requirement had been put on equal 
footing with the deficit criterion. It was stated that the transition period in the case of Italy 
was set between 2013 and 2015.94 
    Italy was considered not making sufficient progress towards compliance with the debt 
criterion thus not reaching the set out targets for the country. According to the report Italy was 
not making sufficient progress towards compliance with the debt reduction target for 2014 
and 2015, falling short of the required MLSA. It was thus assessed that prima facie there was 
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Italy (2013/314/EU). 21.06.2013. 
93 Report from the commission Italy Report prepared in accordance with Article 126(3) of the Treaty. Brussels, 
27.2.2015. COM(2015) 113 final.  
94 Ibid. 
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a risk of the existence of an excessive deficit, in the sense of the SGP. However if all factors 
were indeed taken into account there appeared to be a different picture.95 
    The deficit criterion was forecasted to be respected in the sense of the SGP. However the 
debt criterion appeared not to be respected on account of the planned measures not being 
sufficient to meet the requirements set out for the debt reduction benchmark, thus not reaching 
the MLSA targets set out for it. The assessment of the compliance with the debt criterion thus 
showed that prima facie the debt criterion in the sense of the SGP was not complied with. 
However, taking into account all relevant factors, as required by Article 126(3) of the TFEU, 
especially important in the case of a breach of a debt criterion due to the influence the factors 
outside the control of the government tend to have on the government debt, it was clear that 
the currently unfavorable economic conditions, with particularly low inflation, created 
particularly demanding conditions for Italy under which it was considered exceptionally hard 
to respect the debt rule. However the MTO and the expectations that compliance with the 
required adjustment towards the MTO was going to occur was broadly ensured, and the 
implementation of ambitious growth-enhancing reforms alongside with the commitment of 
the Italian authorities advocated for the debt, defined in the Treaty and in Regulation (EC) No 
1467/1997, to be considered as complied with at the moment.96 
    In addition the report stated that respecting the MLSA in 2014 and 2015, required by the 
debt rule, would call for targets significantly over the countries MTO targets. It was 
considered that the necessary additional measures in the current economic environment would 
eventually lead to negative effects on growth and hence further aggravate the deflationary 
trends in the economy, consequently working in the opposite direction of the intended.97 
    Moreover the Communication on flexibility issued by the Commission on January 13th 
2015 was highlighted together with the fact that the implementation of growth-enhancing 
structural reforms was to be considered when analyzing all relevant events regarding the 
economic, budgetary and debt position. Thus the commitment, on the behalf of Italy, to an 
ambitious structural reform agenda and a rapid implementation of it was emphasized as an 
important contribution to the process of bringing down the debt-to-GDP ratio on a satisfactory 
reduction path.98 
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    The reforms expected in the structural reform plan submitted by Italy were supposed to 
concern public administration and judicial system, competiveness and product markets, the 
labour market, education and the taxation system.99 
   Among the reforms considered to in the future have a positive impact on growth were first 
and foremost the reform concerning the labour market, the Jobs Act law. This reform had 
been adopted with the expectation of further adoption and implementation of several 
legislative decrees in this area. Taxation was addressed through a sizeable reduction in the 
labour tax wedge for 2015. The issues concerning the institutional and administrative 
efficiency, considered having a hampering effect on the business environment and growth, 
were addressed through the ongoing legislative process on institutional reform as well as the 
parliamentary adoption process on the enabling law on public administration reform. 
Concerning the reforms for the improvement of the judicial system, several measures were 
still pending while a number of the provisions had been converted into final law. The reforms 
on competition were considered to be on their way as the draft law had been adopted by the 
government however it still had to be approved by the parliament. The reform of the school 
system was expected to get underway in 2015 through the announcement of a decree law on 
this reform plan.100 
    All things considered and all relevant factors taken into consideration Italy was thus for 
now considered to be in compliance with the SGP due to the attempted structural reform and 
the unfavorable economic conditions.101 
4.2.7 CONCLUDING REMARKS  
    As in the case of France, the financial crisis of 2008 is considered by the Commission and 
the Council to have affected Italy throughout the investigated timeframe. The financial crisis 
is considered to be a mitigating factor for Italy’s failure to meet the budget targets in all 
investigated documents, resulting in the abrogation of an EDP in 2013 and in the Commission 
not recommending the initiation of an EDP in 2015. However, as Italy had failed to 
implement the necessary measures before the financial crisis, the Member State was put under 
an EDP in 2009, despite the crisis adverse effects on the economy.  
    Furthermore, since the introduction of the communication “Making the best use of the 
flexibility within the existing rules of the Stability and Growth Pact” the Council and 
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Commission have allowed Italy to deviate from the debt and deficit targets due to the Member 
State’s attempts at structural reform further emphasizing the use of fiscal flexibility. 
    In answer to the research question stated above it can be assessed that in regard to Italy the 
Commission and the Council have accepted deviation from the budget targets when the 
deviation is due to exogenous shocks and efforts at structural reform. When the deviation was 
due to factors considered as being within Italy’s control, the Commission and the Council 
took disciplinary action.  
    The actions of the Council and the Commission have thus been in line with the 
macroeconomic theory behind fiscal discipline and fiscal flexibility. Italy has only been 
allowed to deviate from the debt and deficit targets due to exogenous shocks and attempts at 
structural reform. When Italy failed to reach the targets due to the failure to undertake 
necessary measures to make the economy more resilient to exogenous shocks prior to the 
financial crisis the Council and the Commission took disciplinary action and enforced fiscal 
discipline. 
5. CONCLUSION 
Both attempts at structural reform and exogenous shocks have been considered as mitigating 
factors by the Commission and the Council which is consistent with the macroeconomic 
theories behind fiscal policy rules. It was, however, not until 2015 that attempts at structural 
reform was considered as a mitigating factor. It can thus be argued that before 2015, the SGP 
framework was not consistent with macroeconomic theory in this aspect and might have 
hindered the Member States from undertaking much needed structural reforms. This aspect is 
particularly interesting as the Commission and the Council, before 2015, stressed the need for 
structural reform in the Member States. By allowing attempts at structural reform as a 
mitigating factor when assessing whether a Member State has reached the targets, the 
Member States are no longer hindered by the SGP and positive effects of the fiscal policy 
rules might have been strengthened.  
    When the Member States have failed to reach the debt and deficit targets due to exogenous 
shocks, the Commission and the Council have on several occasions stated that, if the Member 
States would undertake the necessary measures to meet the debt and deficit targets, the 
damage due to the contraction of the economy caused by the efforts needed for the targets to 
be met would be severe. It can therefore be concluded that the Commission and the Council 
have taken into account the possible negative effects by strictly following fiscal rules 
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mentioned in the theory and avoided to take measures that might be harmful to the economy 
but would have enforced fiscal discipline among the Member States.  
    It can further be concluded that Italy and France have received similar treatment from the 
Commission and the Council during the investigated timeframe when assessing the debt and 
deficit criteria. A study including more Member States might have reached a different 
conclusion as both the investigated countries are among the largest economies of the EU 
which might have influenced the decisions of the Commission and the Council. A study 
including some of the smaller Member States might have produced another result.  
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